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SELLING THE IDEA TO TELL THE TRUTH:
THE PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATOR
AND MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW
Joseph D. Grano*
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d edition). By Fred
E. Inbau, John E. Reid, and Joseph P. Buckley. Baltimore: Williams
& Wilkins. 1986. Pp. xvii, 353. $28.50.

Of necessity, therefore, interrogators must deal with criminal suspects on a somewhat lower moral plane than that upon which ethical,
law-abiding citizens are expected to conduct their everyday affairs. That
plane, in the interest of innocent suspects, need only be subject to the
following restriction: Although both "fair" and "unfair" interrogation
practices are permissible, nothing shall be done or said to the suspect
that will be apt to make an innocent person confess. [p. xvii]
I share the view that not many innocent men (at least those of average intelligence and educational background) are likely to succumb to
these "methods of debatable propriety." But how many innocent men
are likely to be subjected to these methods? How "tough" would the
American lawyer's reaction be if he had some notion of "the price" we
pay in terms of human liberty and individual dignity? 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The third edition of Criminal Interrogation and Confessions is a
book in two parts. The first part, an instruction manual, strives to
teach professional interrogators how to obtain a confession from a
guilty suspect who is not inclined to confess. The second part contains
an analysis of the law pertaining to police interrogation. Touted as
"an entirely new book" (p. v), the third edition, particularly in the first
part, actually replicates much of what is found in the earlier editions.
The organization, however, is much more elaborate: while the second
edition, for example, simply listed from A to Z the tactics and techniques for successful interrogation, 2 the third edition has rearranged
• Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1965, J.D. 1968, Temple
University; LL.M. 1970, University of Illinois. - Ed.
·
1. Kamisar, What is an "Involuntary" Confession: Some Comments on lnbau and Reid's
Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 732 (1963) (emphasis in
original) (footnote omitted).
2. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS ix-x (2d ed. 1967).
Joseph Buckley did not join the book until the third edition.
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these tactics into "nine steps to effectiveness" (pp. 77-84). 3 Beginning
with immediate efforts to "disarm" the suspect from the moment the
interrogator is introduced (p. 84-85), moving deliberately to the "critical stage" when the increasingly apprehensive suspect has become indecisive about whether he should continue to lie (p. 159), proceeding
quickly thereafter to the suspect's first admission of guilt (pp. 165-70),
and concluding with a detailed oral and then written confession (pp.
171-78), the new organization offers the interrogator'·a systematic
strategy for "selling the suspect on the idea to tell the truth" (p. 154).
While the authors' suggested interrogation tactics, even if refined
and rearranged, have remained largely the same, each edition of this
book has come forward against a different backdrop of constitutional
law. Because then prevailing due process doctrine made denial of
counsel merely one factor to consider in a voluntariness determination, 4 the first edition, published in 1962, appropriately could suggest
means to dissuade a suspect from persisting in an expressed desire to
remain silent or to consult a lawyer. 5 Escobedo v. Illinois 6 and Miranda v. Arizona, 7 however, 'prompted a second edition just five years
later. Although the embittered authors conceded that the police had a
legal and moral obligation to comply with the strictures of these new
cases, they also insisted that most of the first edition's tactics still
could be used after such compliance. 8 Nevertheless, the authors had
doubts and fears:
If we are in error with regard to our interpretation of the Miranda
case, then the Supreme Court has but orie more move to make, and that
is to outlaw all interrogations of criminal suspects. We say this because
of our confidence that effective interrogations can only be conducted by
such procedures as the ones we herein describe. 9

As the authors recognize in the preface to the third edition, the law
governing police interrogation has changed considerably since they expressed these fears (p. v). Miranda remains alive, but the present
Supreme Court has signaled clearly that it will not make "one more
3. The second step, "theme development," offers eleven themes for the interrogator to develop, pp. viii-ix; each was presented as a "tactic" or "technique" in the second edition. Id. The
authors have summarized the nine steps on a small card that accompanies the book. W.hile
convenient, the card is less wieldy than the Miranda cards the police often carry.
4. See Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
5. F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 111-12 (1962).
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964)(recognizing sixth amendment right to counsel, at least upon request,
during custodial police interrogation). Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), with its much
broader holding, quickly eclipsed Escobedo. While Escobedo's result would remain the same
today under Miranda, the Court is now of the view that Escobedo should have been decided on
fifth and not sixth amendment grounds. See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (promulgating, pursuant to the fifth amendment, elaborate warning
and waiver requirements prior to custodial interrogation).
8. F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at 1.
9. Id.,- see also id. at 195-97 (expressing some concern that the Court might prohibit police
trickery).
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move" to eliminate police interrogation. 10 Indeed, those who worship
at Miranda's shrine view several of the Court's recent decisions as the
prelude to Miranda's ultimate demise. 11 Emboldened by these recent
developments, the authors now confidently urge the police to read Miranda more narrowly than they suggested in the second edition. 12
While the authors have good reason for much of their confidence,
the third edition nevertheless should leave informed readers with an
uneasy sense that a fundamental tension exists between the book's suggested tactics and the underlying principles, if not the most recent
holdings, of modern confessions law. The interrogation tactics the authors advocate do not comfortably coexist with the normative foundations of cases like Escobedo and Miranda, even as narrowly read.
Similarly, as the introductory quotations to this essay illustrate, the
philosophy of the authors is poles apart from that of Miranda's most
passionate defenders, such as Professor Yale Kamisar. 13 While the
authors continue to insist on compliance with Miranda, their view of
the function and proper scope of police interrogation is clearly not the
view of Miranda and its defenders. 14
The present Supreme Court would not have spawned Miranda.
Nevertheless, perhaps because of institutional considerations, the
Court seems disinclined to take the drastic step of overruling Miranda
and rethinking the basic premises of confessions law. Although judicial restraint is usually praiseworthy, in this context it can only assure
continuation of the tension between Miranda's philosophical assumptions and those that to a large extent the present Court and the authors share. Moreover, the Court's failure to resolve this tension
increases the likelihood that a future Court will take the step that worried the authors twenty years ago, for someday the tension will have to
be resolved.
10. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
11. See, e.g., Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Minded?}, The Burger
Court (Is It Really, So Prosecution Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices in THE BURGER
COURT: THE COUNTER REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 82-86 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 99. But see Kamisar, supra at 86-90.
As a critic of Miranda, I recently have argued that the Court has undermined Miranda's legitimacy by its current understanding of what it did in that case. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in
Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, SO Nw. U. L. REV. 100 (1985).
12. For example, the recommended warnings and waiver procedure are not as explicit and
detailed as in the second edition. Compare pp. 229-30 with F. INBAU & J. REID, supra note 2, at
181-82. In addition, the authors now emphasize that police should not repeat or embellish the
warnings, give them prematurely, or substitute written for oral waivers. Pp. 220-32.
13. See note 1 supra and preceding text. Over the years, Professor Kamisar has been Professor Inbau's most persistent critic. See Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: "The Importance of Being
Guilty," 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 182 (1977). Professor Kamisar's writings on confession
law are collected and updated in Y. KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
(1980).
14. Miranda's extensive criticism of the first edition of the authors' book makes this apparent. See 384 U.S. at 448-55 & nn.9-23.

February-April 1986]

Interrogation and Confessions

665

In section II of this essay, I attempt to illustrate the tension between the authors' suggested tactics and the premises of modern confessions law. My purpose is to show that the authors' approach to
police interrogation is pervasively, not just occasionally, inconsistent
with both strands of thought that have influenced current legal doctrine. Section III critiques these two strands of thought and argues
that the tension should be resolved by rejecting the premises of modern confessions law. is
II.

THE TENSION BETWEEN PROFESSIONAL INTERROGATION AND
THE PREMISES OF MODERN CONFESSIONS LAW

Putting aside specific doctrinal holdings and concentrating on philosophical underpinnings, two strands of thought have influenced modern confessions law. The first, most apparent in sixth amendment
cases but infecting fifth amendment cases as well, is that a suspect
needs and should have assistance in matching wits with the police during interrogation. 16 The second, most prevalent in fifth amendment
cases, is that a custodial suspect needs and should have protection
against the pressures to confess that are generated by interrogation.
For those who typically applaud Warren Court decisions, these
strands are not separate and independent but rather interrelated expressions of what human dignity requires.1 7
15. This essay does not review the authors' legal analysis in part two of the book. It should
be noted, however, that this part of the book is not completely satisfactory. First, although
chapter eight is intended for nonlawyers and chapter nine for prosecutors, p. xiii, the chapters are
equally lacking in depth and largely repetitious. Second, the authors' treatment of the law is
sometimes confusing if not misleading. For example, they continue to suggest, contrary to the
facts, that the old due process voluntariness test was based on the concern of excluding untrustworthy confessions. Pp. 246-47. In addition, they fail to distinguish clearly fifth and sixth
amendment cases, pp. 238, 295, 303, even though the Court's doctrine in these two areas is
different. Their repeated discussion of Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (sixth amend·
ment holding) in the context of Miranda issues is particularly distracting.
As an overview for police officers, the authors' legal analysis may be sufficient. Unfortunately, the authors could have done much more to support their philosophy of police
interrogation.
16. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court's primary concern was the presence of "compulsion," but the concern discussed in the text is also apparent. For example, the
Court frowned on the use of trickery. 384 U.S. at 451-53. It also expressed concern about the
suspect's ability to make an "intelligent" decision whether to remain silent, a decision in which
he would appreciate the consequences of agreeing to talk. 384 U.S. at 468-69. The Court suggested that the suspect should be reminded that the police are not acting solely in his interest,
and it opined that those who do not request counsel typically are most in need of counsel's
assistance. 384 U.S. at 469-71. Miranda's defenders similarly combine a concern about compulsion with a concern about the suspect making an intelligent, rational choice. See the authorities
cited in note 17 infra.
The Court today is much less inclined to mix sixth amendment concerns in its fifth amendment analysis. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986) (failure of police to inform suspect
that lawyer wanted to see him does not invalidate Miranda waiver or otherwise violate
Constitution).
17. See, e.g., Schrock, Welsh & Collins, Jnterrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v.
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A. Police Interrogation and Intelligent Choice
Although Escobedo v. Illinois 18 has little vitality today as a sixth
amendment case, 19 its reasoning, which illustrates the first strand of
modem confessions thinking, still exerts influence. After the police
confronted Escobedo with an accomplice who accused him of the fatal
shooting, Escobedo responded that the accomplice, not he, had fired
the shots. The Supreme Court sympathetically observed that Escobedo as a layman undoubtedly was unaware that his admission of
complicity was as damaging as an admission that he had fired the fatal
shots. 20 The Court stated that Escobedo needed counsel's legal aid and
advice, because what resulted during the interrogation could affect the
later trial. 21 Absent the right to counsel's advice, the trial would be
"no more than an appeal from the interrogation," with conviction virtually assured by the suspect's confession. 22
We can appreciate how remarkable this reasoning is only by focusing clearly on the evils the Court identified as warranting relief. The
primary evil is the suspect making an uninformed and unintelligent
decision to confess. To assure an informed and intelligent decision,
one that comports with the suspect's best interests, counsel should be
present to provide aid and advice. A second evil is the police obtaining
evidence from the suspect that will help assure his conviction. The
suspect will not have much chance of mounting an effective defense at
trial - that is, of winning an acquittal - if he confesses, and for some
reason, not articulated, this is undesirable even when the suspect is
guilty.23
If these concerns are legitimate, the tactics the authors advocate
should have no place in our law. Indeed, if one takes Escobedo 's reasoning seriously, all police interrogation should be prohibited until the
defendant has had an opportunity to consult with a lawyer. Under
Arizona, 52 S. CAL. L. R.Ev. 1, 42 n.174 (1978); White, Police Trickery i11 Inducing Confessions,
127 U. PA. L. REV. 581 (1979); see also Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 211-24.
18. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
19. Since Escobedo, the Court has held that sixth amendment rights attach not at custody but
only at or after the start of adversary judicial proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct.
1135 (1986); United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); see also Grano, Rhode Island v.
Innis: A Need to Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17
AM. CRIM. L. REV. l, 5-31 (1979) (reviewing the Court's cases). The demise of Escobedo as a
sixth amendment case actually occurred in Miranda. See id. at 6 n.38. Escobedo's reasoning still
controls sixth amendment analysis, however, when the interrogation occurs after the start of
adversary judicial proceedings. See Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
20. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 486.
21. 378 U.S. at 486-89.
22. 378 U.S. at 487-88.
23. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1438-43 (1985). Escobedo
also referred to the danger of compulsory self-incrimination. See 378 U.S. at 488-89. This facilitated the Court's subsequent reinterpretation of Escobedo as a fifth amendment case. See note 19

supra.
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Escobedo 's constitutional vision, we cannot rest comfortably with a
system that permits the availability of legal assistance to turn on the
suspect's hurried response to a less than enthusiastic police warning.
Indeed, the procurement of legal advice must depend in such a system
more on chance than on a reasoned exercise of judgment.24 Of course,
as the authors and others know, provision of counsel to all defendants
before interrogation would facilitate intelligent choice only by virtually eliminating the possibility of confessions, for the only advice a
competent lawyer typically will give, particularly if the suspect is
guilty, is not to make a statement. 25 This, however, is the necessary
price of taking Escobedo seriously.
To avoid having to justify either Escobedo's premises or our tolerance of unexacting waivers, some may be willing to accept the present
system as an uneasy compromise between the logical ramifications of
these premises and the feared elimination of police interrogation.
Those with this understanding may think it more productive to use
Escobedo 's reasoning to identify interrogation tactics that undermine
the suspect's ability to appreciate the significance of an admission or
confession. The contradictions in modern confessions law, however,
cannot be avoided by this strategy, for candid analysis necessitates the
conclusion that Escobedo 's reasoning prohibits not just certain interrogation tactics but interrogation itself.
The authors' book illustrates this point. The tension between Escobedo and the authors' philosophy does not arise in isolated passages
that graphically depict successful strategies of deceit and trickery but
rather permeates the entire book. In the Preface, for example, Inbau
praises Reid, his now deceased coauthor, as an interrogation specialist
who "personally trained many persons to become excellent interrogators" (p. v). Similarly, the authors argue that ideally only intelligent
officers who have studied "the art of criminal interrogation" should be
permitted to conduct interrogations (p. 35). An intelligent, welltrained interrogator, however, is likely to convince a guilty suspect to
tell the truth, a decision that will help assure conviction and that the
suspect typically will come to regret. In the battle of wits, the professional interrogator trained in psychology is more likely than the untrained officer to outsmart the suspect and obtain an incriminating
statement. Under Escobedo 's reasoning, an excellent, professional interrogator should be deplored rather than applauded.
The professional interrogator is only the first difficulty. In the
name of human dignity, academic commentators frequently denounce
24. Cf. Weisberg, Police Interrogation ofArrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 21, 40-41 (1961) (effectiveness of warning depends upon its emphasis and spirit).
25. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). A confession in a
plea bargaining context may be advantageous, but a confession to the police typically is not in the
suspect's interest.
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as improper interrogation tactics that take advantage of inexperienced
and ignorant suspects. 26 Undoubtedly to the consternation of such
critics, the authors demonstrate in their book that morally neutral procedures, which no one would condemn, and courteous, polite procedures, which critics would applaud, have as their purpose and effect
the same function of outwitting the suspect. For example, the authors
instruct the interrogator not to take notes, for taking notes "may
grimly remind the suspect of the legal significance or implication of an
incriminating remark" (p. 36). They insist that the interrogator
should wear civilian clothes, for otherwise "the suspect will be reminded constantly of police custody and the possible consequence~ of
an incriminating disclosure" (p. 36). They even warn against bad
breath, distracting facial appearances, and clothing disarray, for all of
these may annoy or distract the suspect and reduce "the effectiveness
of an interrogation" (pp. 37-38). If the authors' advice is sound, those
who aim to protect the suspect's ability to act in his best interests
should insist that only inexperienced, disheveled, uniformed officers,
with garlic on their breath, conduct interrogations.
The authors also admonish the interrogator to be polite and courteous to the suspect. For example, the interrogator should use the
suspect's last name, preceded by Mr., Mrs., or Miss, particularly if the
suspect has a low economic status (pp. 38-39). By thus flattering the
person and providing him a sense of dignity from such unaccustomed
courtesy, "the interrogator will enhance the effectiveness of whatever
he says or does thereafter" (p. 39). To illustrate the importance of
courteous behavior, the authors tell of a murder suspect whom a police officer inappropriately addressed as an "old whore." To counter
this negative tactic, and to win the suspect's confidence, the interrogator (one of the authors) displayed respect and concern for the suspect.
Thus, upon learning that she had not eaten, he obtained food for her.
By treating her "as a 'lady,' " he soon had the desired confession (pp.
39-40). Similarly, the authors instruct the interrogator not to use derogatory names, even in jest, toward homosexuals or racial minorities
(pp. 40, 199). Indeed, in dealing with a homosexual, "[i]t is much
more effective" for the interrogator to act as if homosexuality is
morally acceptable (pp. 40, 99). The skillful interrogator must
"[r]ecognize that in everyone there is some good," for the suspect's
good characteristics can be utilized in the effort for a successful interrogation (p. 42).
While many will applaud this advice, the authors offer it not because they believe such police behavior is morally mandated but because such behavior will help the interrogator to obtain a confession.
26. See Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARYL. REV.
15, 40-41 (1981); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation ofBenefit, and the Modem Law of Confessions, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 275; see also White, supra note 17.
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As candidly stated in an appendix reviewing the psychological principles of police interrogation, the goal of the entire interrogation process
is "to decrease the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing" (p. 332).27 This is precisely what Escobedo and Miranda aimed to
combat28 and what the defenders of these cases excoriate.
To be sure, most of the authors' suggested stratagems are not so
benign. Having directly confronted the suspect with belief in his giiilt
at the beginning of the interrogation (pp. 84-93), the interrogator
should next develop a "theme," which either will present a moral excuse for the crime or minimize its moral implications (p. 93). Possible
themes include, among others, that anyone under similar conditions
would have done the same thing (pp. 97-99), that the suspect had a
more acceptable motivation for the crime than the one actually
surmised (pp. 102-06), that others, including the victim, deserve condemnation (pp. 106-18), and that the victim or witnesses must be exaggerating (pp. 120-25). By seeking to convince the suspect that he is
less morally reprehensible than the facts of the case indicate, the various themes "establish the psychological foundation to achieve an implicit, if not explicit, early, general admission of guilt" (p. 97). If the
suspect denies the crime, the interrogator may use a "baiting" question, such as "Jim, is there any reason you can think of why one of
Mary's neighbors would say your car was seen parked in front of her
home that night?" Not knowing whether his car was seen, the suspect, if he is guilty, must decide whether to deny or explain this accusation; either way, he runs the risk of being caught in a lie (pp. 6873).29
The authors' case examples illustrate the significance of deceit in
the interrogation process. In one case, an interrogator told a seventeen-year-old arrested for rape that the youth hardly could avoid what
he did; the interrogator also stated that he too, as a boy in high school,
had "roughed it up" with a girl attempting to have intercourse. The
boy, who thereafter confessed, was so relieved that he later explained
to his father that the interrogator had once done the same thing (p.
98). In a child molestation case, the interrogator suggested that the
child was well advanced for her age and probably tried to excite the
suspect (p. 108). The authors contend that the same tactic frequently
27. The Appendix, twenty pages entitled "The Psychological Principles of Criminal Interrogation," was authored by Brian C. Jayne, who is Director of the Reid College of Detection of
Deception. Pp. 327-47.
28. With regard to Miranda and this concern, see note 16 supra and accompanying text.
29. Similarly, if Jim says he was out driving on a certain road, the interrogator can ask him
about a fictitious accident that interfered with traffic. If Jim has been lying, he now faces a
dilemma: if he denies observing the accident and it occurred, the interrogator will have caught
him in a lie; if he admits observing the accident and it did not occur, the interrogator again will
have caught him in a lie. P. 74. Although I have stated in the text that this tactic is less benign
than those previously discussed, I cannot comprehend why anyone would object to it.
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is successful in rape cases (pp. 108-09). 30 While this strategy of casting blame on innocent victims may seem of doubtful utility, the .authors maintain that it works because offenders want to blame their
victims for their crimes (p. 108).
The authors indicate that the interrogator may ease certain suspects into an admission by suggesting excuses like accident, intoxication, or self-defense (pp. 102-03, 166). Indeed, the seventh step in the
interrogation plan is to offer the suspect an alternative question, one
that presents a choice between a repulsive motivation for the crime
and an error attributable to human frailty (p. 165). Once the suspect
makes an admission, the interrogator should begin to develop a detailed and true account. Often the interrogator will have to persuade
the suspect to abandon the moral excuse that he successfully used to
prompt the suspect's first admission (pp. 103, 173). Even if the suspect does not abandon this excuse, the inconsistency between his original denial and the assertions in his confession will make the excuse
seem implausible at trial (p. 104). In developing a full confession, the
interrogator should abandon his earlier reluctance to use words that
might conjure up the legal consequences of confessing, like burglary
and rape (pp. 37, 85). With an admission in hand, the interrogator
now freely should use such descriptive words "so that when these
words are used in the formal written confession, the suspect will be
accustomed to them" (p. 172).
Whatever one thinks of these tactics, they all have the objective
previously mentioned: to convince a suspect who is not so inclined to
abandon a false denial and to admit the truth (p. 154). Telling the
truth, however, typically is not in the best interests of guilty suspects.
In terms of preserving defenses for trial or a position of strength for
plea bargaining, the rational, intelligent course of action for a guilty
suspect, assuming he chooses to respond at all, is to persist in a denial
of the crime. 31 Thus, if we were serious about enabling the suspect to
protect his best interests during police interrogation, everything the
authors recommend, from insincere politeness to overt trickery, would
be disallowed.
Of course, some of the authors' tactics may seem more offensive
than others. Although, as the authors demonstrate, the issue of what
is offensive may be debatable, most would agree, at least in concept,
that truly offensive interrogation techniques should be prohibited.
Once distinctions are made on grounds of perceived offensiveness,
however, it must be conceded that protection of the suspect's ability to
appreciate the significance and consequences of his actions is not our
30. During interrogation, the goal is not to defend the victim's honor, protect the victim's
sensibilities, or vindicate the themes of law and order; the goal is to persuade the guilty suspect to
confess. Once the suspect confesses, of course, these other concerns will be satisfied.
31. Of course the most intelligent course of action is simply to refuse to answer questions.
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real concern. At least this must be conceded absent empirical evidence that "offensive" tactics outwit the suspect more successfully
than inoffensive ones.
To shift the legal focus from the suspect's ability to make an intelligent choice to offensive police tactics is to move in the direction of
vindicating the authors' position on police interrogation. First, such a
shift eliminates Escobedo 's line of argument for a right to counsel's
assistance during police interrogation. While counsel may be necessary to ensure intelligent choice, counsel is not necessary to prohibit
offensive interrogation techniques: neutral observers behind one-way
mirrors could accomplish such a limited goal. Second, such a shift in
the legal concern resolves some of the tension and contradictions in
the status quo. It does this by denying Escobedo's unsupported premise that an evil occurs whenever an interrogator outsmarts the defendant by persuading him to admit, truthfully and against his best interests, involvement in the crime.
B. Police Interrogation and Compulsion

Although Miranda v. Arizona 32 reflects some of Escobedo 's reasoning, it primarily illustrates the second strand of modem confessions
thinking - the desire to protect the suspect from compulsion. While
the due process voluntariness doctrine always reflected this concern, 33
Miranda for the first time viewed as evil the mere "inherent compulsion" of custodial interrogation. 34 As Justice Harlan's dissent demonstrated, before Miranda the Court had not read the fifth amendment as
prohibiting "all pressure to incriminate one's self"; 35 rather, the
Court's concern had been "to sift out undue pressure, not to assure
spontaneous confessions." 3 6
The Miranda Court viewed the warnings it promulgated and the
waiver requirements it imposed as "protective devices" that would
"dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings." 37 Of
course, contradictions immediately were apparent. If a simple response to a single custodial question must be viewed as presumptively
compelled, the possibility of having a voluntary waiver is difficult to
understand. 38 Similarly, if the right to counsel's presence in this fifth
amendment sense arises because "[t]he circumstances surrounding in32. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
33. See generally Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L.
REV. 859, 874-80, 896-909 (1979).
34. 384 U.S. at 458, 467, 468, 478.
35. 384 U.S. at 512 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
36. 384 U.S. at 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
37. 384 U.S. at 458.
38. 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). The incongruities help explain why the present
Court has found it so easy to read Miranda as having promulgated a mere "prophylactic rule,"
one designed to combat the potential for compulsion rather than actual compulsion. While such
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custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear the will of
one merely made aware of his privilege,"39 allowing the defendant to
subject himself to such overbearing pressures by waiving his rights is
incomprehensible. One can comprehend the concept of waiver with
respect to rights such as trial by jury, but as Justice Marshall remarked in a different context, "no sane person would knowingly relinquish a right to be free of compulsion."40 Apart from whether a sane
person would make such a waiver, no decent system of law would
permit a person to relinquish his right not to be subject to pressures
that overbear the will. 41 Finally, even if the concern is an "intelligent
decision" with regard to the exercise of fifth amendment rights, 42 the
likelihood of achieving intelligent choice when the waiver decision
must be made quickly in the police station is small. 43
Inherent compulsion is the compulsion that is present in any custodial interrogation. If inherent compulsion is an evil to be eradicated, it
must follow that any additional pressures the police bring to bear upon
the suspect also are impermissible. As before, however, this cannot be
taken seriously unless one is prepared to prohibit all custodial questioning by a professional interrogator. For if the first goal of the skillful interrogator is "to decrease the suspect's perception of the
consequences of confessing,"44 the second is to "increas[e] the suspect's internal anxiety associated with his deception" (p. 332).
The authors' suggestions for increasing anxiety begin with the interrogation room, which should be free of any small objects that the
suspect might fumble with as a tension-relieving activity. Such activity "can detract from the effectiveness of the interrogation, especially
during the critical phase when a guilty person may be trying desperately to suppress an urge to confess" (p. 29). Similarly, because smoking may relieve tension or "bolster . . . resistance to an effective
interrogation," the room should be free of ashtrays. Moreover, the
a reading can help make sense of Miranda, it destroys the case's legitimacy as constitutional law.
See Grano, supra note 11.
39. 384 U.S. at 469.
40. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 280-81 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
41. Semantic precision is important here. If we are talking about "a right of silence," the
concept of waiver makes sense: by agreeing to talk, the suspect waives his right of silence. While
Miranda does make reference to such a right, the passage under discussion in the text, which is
truer to the constitutional language, speaks of the defendant's right not to be "compelled" to
become a witness against himself. If custodial interrogation very quickly can "overbear the will"
of a suspect, even one warned of a right not to answer, then the Court's waiver doctrine permits
the suspect to waive his right to be free of such overbearing pressure. One can put this in perspective by imagining such a waiver doctrine with regard to torture.
Miranda's supporters may be tempted immediately to switch from a "compulsion" argument
to a "right of silence" argument. In reality, the latter right does not exist. See text at notes 12122 infra.
42. 384 U.S. at 468.
43. See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
44. See text at note 27 supra.
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interrogator should discourage smoking by abstaining himself and by
suggesting, if a request is made, that the suspect wait until he leaves
the room (p. 38). Likewise, chairs that induce slouching or leaning
back are "psychologically undesirable" (p. 30). The interrogator
should sit about four or five feet away from the suspect, with no furniture in between them. "Sitting or standing a long distance away or the
presence of an obstruction of any sort . . . affords a guilty suspect a
certain degree of relief and confidence not otherwise attainable" (p.
37).
The emphasis on increasing anxiety is evident throughout the
book. The authors suggest that someone other than the interrogator
should escort the suspect into the interrogation room, direct him to
the appropriate chair, and provide him the name of the person who
will be talking to him. This formal identification procedure "tends to
heighten the apprehension of a guilty suspect by reason of the apparent exalted status of the interrogator"; it also tends to diminish the
suspect's confidence in his ability to evade detection (p. 37). After
about five minutes, the interrogator should enter deliberately and with
"an air of confidence." Emulating a busy medical specialist, the interrogator should be polite but professional. If the suspect offers his
hand, the interrogator should respond with a "very casual handshake"; otherwise the interrogator should offer a brief greeting without
shaking hands (p. 84). The preliminaries over, the interrogator's first
step, at least with suspects whose guilt seems reasonably certain,
should be a direct, positive statement, expressed in a "slow, deliberate,
and confident manner," that the police believe the suspect committed
the offense (pp. 84-85). Psychologically, this "tends to shatter the
well-developed network of defense mechanisms that the suspect has
established since committing the crime" (p. 345).
As the interrogation proceeds, the interrogator should increase the
suspect's feelings of uneasiness about lying and prevent occurrences
that would enable the suspect to regain confidence. If the suspect begins to cry, the interrogator should not leave the suspect alone to "cry
it out," for "the suspect who is given that opportunity may fortify
himself and return to the denial stage" (p. 164). Because the interrogator must not permit role reversal to occur, he should correct a suspect who attempts to flatter the interrogator by inflating his title (p.
120). The interrogator must make "every discreet effort" to prevent
repeated denials of the crime, for this "deprives the guilty suspect of
the psychological fortification that would be derived from repetitious
disclaimers of guilt" (pp. 142-43).
The critical stage of the interrogation occurs when the suspect experiences tension between an "aroused impulse to confess" and his
perception of the consequences of confessing. At this point, if the suspect regains his composure, the gains of the interrogator's prior efforts
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will be lost (p. 159). The interrogator should now move his chair
closer: "This will decrease the suspect's confidence while simultaneously increasing anxiety" (pp. 159-60). The interrogator should move
in small increments without stopping the conversation or losing eye
contact: "A guilty suspect will usually be aware of an increased feeling of uneasiness as the interrogator moves closer but often will not
consciously recognize that the cause for it is the physical proximity of
the interrogator. The suspect simply senses or perceives that lying is
becoming more uncomfortable" (p. 161).
The authors do impose limits on what "a professionally skilled and
ethical interrogator" (p. 129) may do to increase the suspect's anxiety.
Although the interrogator must be patient and persistent, conveying
the impression that he has "all the time in the world," he may not
engage in "unreasonably long interrogations" (pp. 195-96).45 Likewise, while the interrogator should confront the suspect with belief in
his guilt, he should not extend an accusation "beyond the point where
mental distress becomes a reasonable probability" (p. 93). The interrogator should avoid anger and personal involvement, for interrogation "should be strictly a professional undertaking" (p. 195). The
authors do endorse the "friendly-unfriendly" act when other techniques of sympathy and understanding have failed, but during the unfriendly episode the interrogator may resort only to verbal
condemnation of the suspect; "under no circumstances should physical abuse or threats of abuse or other mistreatment ever be employed"
(pp. 151-53). Indeed, as the appendix explains, the concept of increasing the suspect's anxiety refers only to "the suspect's internal feelings
of uneasiness as a result of his own cognitive dissonance"; it is not
intended to suggest "use of any threats, coercion, or abuse to the suspect" (p. 332).
As with tactics designed to outsmart the suspect, distinctions can
be made in terms of perceived offensiveness among tactics designed to
increase the suspect's anxiety. The point remains, however, that all
such tactics, whether or not "offensive," are intended to increase the
pressure - the compulsion - on the suspect to confess. The "inherent compulsion" of custodial interrogation would be present if an untrained, uniformed officer questioned the suspect in the stationhouse
receiving room. 46 The professional interrogator, with his anxiety-inducing tactics, is employed precisely because the inherent pressures of
custodial interrogation usually are insufficient by themselves to pro45. The authors suggest that a skillful interrogator rarely will need more than four hours to
obtain a confession. P. 310.
46. In the authors' view, "[t]he principal psychological factor contributing to a successful
interrogation is privacy." P. 24. The authors condemn interrogation efforts that occur with large
numbers of spectators present. Pp. 24-28.
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duce the desired confession. If they were sufficient, the who and how
of police interrogation would not be the subject of a manual.
The tension, therefore, between the authors' book and Miranda's
premises is inescapable. If orchestrated properly, the warnings and
waiver will occur not simply in the inherently compelling atmosphere
of the stationhouse but in a room purposefully designed to increase the
suspect's anxiety. 47 While those who invoke their Miranda rights will
be spared the inherent pressures of questioning, their luckless counterparts who decide to match wits with the police will be subject to pressures that make the inherent compulsion of a simple question, such as
"Where were you last night?,"48 pale by comparison. If we take seriously Miranda's reasoning, we should not feel comfortable with the
authors' "professional interrogator." Conversely, if we approve the
authors' goal of training professionals for successful interrogation, we
should be candid in recognizing our disapproval of Miranda's premises. Without hypocrisy, we cannot have it both ways.

III. A

CRITIQUE OF THE PREMISES OF MODERN
CONFESSIONS LAW

The authors' suggested tactics are based upon the empirical claim
that because self-condemnation and self-destruction are abnormal,
criminal offenders "ordinarily do not utter unsolicited, spontaneous
confessions" (p. xvi). This proposition is not controversial.49 Similarly, a police officer rarely will obtain a confession by lecturing the
suspect about morality, providing him pencil and paper, and trusting
that the suspect's conscience will compel the truth (p. xvii). It necessarily follows that if confessions are viewed as desirable and important, police interrogation must be recognized as a legitimate
institution. It also follows, just as necessarily, that permissible police
interrogation must include tactics designed both to outsmart the sus- ·
pect and to put pressure on him to confess:
If interrogation is the undoing of deception, what are the elements of
deception that can be undone or influenced? To answer this question it
is useful to evaluate why a person chooses to confess. An individual will
confess (tell the truth) when he perceives the consequences of a confession as more desirable than the continued anxiety of deception. If, on
the other hand, the consequences of the confession are perceived as less
desirable than the anxiety associated with deception, the individual will
continue to lie. . . . The goal of interrogation, therefore, is to decrease
47. The authors condemn the giving of premature Miranda warnings. Pp. 224-25.
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White thought that it defied
common sense to suggest that an unwarned response to such a question was compelled. 384 U.S.
at 533-34.
49. Cf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160-61 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (voluntary confession is not voluntary "in the sense of a confession to a priest merely to rid one's soul of
a sense of guilt").
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the suspect's perception of the consequences of confessing, while at the
same time increasing the suspect's internal anxiety associated with his
deception .... [p. 332]so

The above, of course, does not resolve the debate, for the option of
disfavoring confessions remains. The tension in existing confessions
law can be resolved either by rejecting the premises of Escobedo and
Miranda or by taking these premises seriously and accepting their consequences. Forced to choose, many would prefer the logical ramifications of Escobedo and Miranda over a system that permits a
professional interrogator to take advantage of an uncounseled suspect. 51 Of course, others may counterclaim that confessions are essential to the task of solving crime (p. xiv). As a matter of hard
reality, this counterclaim seems difficult to refute, and it may explain
the "compromise" that the status quo reflects: the Miranda Court,
though perhaps desiring to go further, may have believed it impractical to do so. 52 Nevertheless, such practical compromises ultimately
are unsatisfactory, for they are built upon intellectual dishonesty. 53
We should confront directly whether good reasons exist to support the
premises of Escobedo and Miranda. In my view, we have not taken
the premises of these cases seriously because they are fundamentally
unsound.
A.

The Argument for Permitting the Interrogator To Outsmart
the Suspect

Escobedo 's premises provoke some difficult questions. Why should
the law be concerned that Escobedo admitted involvement in a homicide without realizing that this was as damaging as an admission that
he fired the fatal shots?54 Why was the Court concerned that the
"entire thrust" ofEscobedo's interrogation was to put him "in such an
50. Unless the perceived consequences of confessing are reduced and anxiety is increased, the
suspect will not confess. P. 342. The authors emphasize throughout that they oppose tactics that
would increase the risk of an innocent person confessing. P. xiv. Also, the police may not reduce
the perceived consequences of confessing by making promises of leniency. Pp. 196-97. As de·
scribed earlier in this essay, the interrogator aims to reduce the perceived consequences of con·
fessing by offering a "theme" that suggests a moral excuse for the offender's behavior. See text at
notes 28-29 supra.
51. Although he states that Miranda required enough things "at one gulp," Professor
Kamisar also has stated that "a rule that a suspect needs counsel to waive counsel is by no means
unthinkable." Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 47 n.11. It is clear that Professor Kamisar would
eliminate confessions before he would reconsider Miranda. See id. at 222-23 (suggesting the need
to go further than Miranda), 59-64 (rejecting the argument that confessions are essential to successful law enforcement).
52. Cf. id. at 87-89 (suggesting that Miranda reflects a compromise between two competing
positions).
53. Cf. Kuh, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants: Some Views on Miranda v. Arizona, 35
FORDHAM L. REV. 233, 235 (1966) (intellectual honesty would require conclusion that voluntary, intelligent waiver is not possible).
54. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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emotional state as to impair his capacity for rational judgment"?55
Why did the Court express concern that Escobedo's confession virtually assured his conviction for the crime? 56 Stated more directly, why
should we not rejoice that Escobedo's lack of intelligence, rational
judgment, or sophistication enabled the police to obtain reliable evidence to prove his guilt? Why would we prefer to increase the likelihood that defendants like Escobedo will prevail over their
interrogators and thereby increase their chance of winning erroneous
acquittals at trial?57
No reasonable person who accepts the basic legitimacy of society
and its laws can endorse the view that a guilty suspect, like a fox during a hunt, must be given a sporting chance to escape conviction and
punishment. 58 Eschewing sporting theory terminology, many courts
and commentators nevertheless express dismay that the suspect is on
an "unequal footing with his interrogators." 59 Reduced to its essentials, however, the desire for equality between the suspect and interrogator reflects the same sporting theory that the commentators
carefully avoid. 60 To advocate such equality is to express indifference, if not actual hostility, to the likelihood of police success in the
interrogation process. Were ascertainment of truth the desideratum,
inequality would be a concern only to the extent it created a risk of a
false confession. Equality between contestants makes for good sports,
but in a criminal investigation we should be seeking truth rather than
entertainment. 61
It should be apparent that 'the desire for equality between the suspect and the interrogator is not a reason for limiting interrogation but
rather a conclusion itself in need of justification. Echoing Escobedo,
55. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 465 (discussing Escobedo).
56. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
57. In attempting to answer these questions, I am drawing on a currently unpublished talk,
Police Interrogation and Confessions: A Rebuttal to Misconceived Objections, which I delivered
on February 10, 1986, at the New York University School of Law Center for Research in Crime
and Justice.
58. Bentham was especially critical of what he labeled the "fox-hunter's" argument for excluding evidence. See 5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 238 (1827); 7 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 454 (Bowring ed. 1843); see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 144143 (arguing that Escobedo embraced a sporting theory of justice).
59. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54 (1962); see also, e.g., White, supra note 17, at 604
(criticizing police trickery because of the "relative strengths of the suspect and the police in this
context").
60. The adversary model, which depends on the parties for the development of evidence,
requires relatively even resources at trial because inequality increases the risk of inaccuracy.
Assuming, however, as the authors insist, that we prohibit police tactics that are likely to induce
an innocent person to confess, the concern for accuracy does not demand equality between a
suspect and police interrogator. Indeed, equality in the police station, unlike equality at trial,
impedes the discovery of tru!h.
61. Unfortunately, "[p]rofessionals sometimes give the appearance of believing that procedure was created for their special interests, not least to provide the entertainment of a fascinating
play." Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 724 (1942).

678

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 84:662

some commentators have argued that the suspect needs equality in the
police station "to protect his chances at the forthcoming trial." 62 Unfortunately, to justify this latter goal, one must again fall back on a
sporting theory. A system committed to ascertainment of truth would
not value for its own sake the goal of giving guilty defendants some
chance to escape conviction. Of course, the rules of procedure sometimes purposely increase the risk of erroneous acquittal because of our
special abhorrence of erroneous conviction. 63 It is one thing, however, to increase a guilty defendant's chances of acquittal at trial to
serve some overriding goal, such as protection of the innocent; it is
another to do so when no such other goal exists. In any event, the
purpose of pretrial investigation is to develop an airtight case against
the offender. Nowhere, except in the rhetoric of confessions law, does
the law reflect anxiety that the investigation may be too successful and
thus deny the defendant a chance for acquittal at trial.
The argument for suspect-interrogator equality cannot be so easily
dismissed when it is made on moral grounds. Professor Schulhofer,
for example, has argued that police manipulation of the suspect is
morally offensive:
•
The voluntariness test ostensibly took account of special weaknesses of
the person interrogated, but because it did permit the use of substantial
pressures, suspects who were ignorant of their rights, unsophisticated
about police practices and court procedures, easily dominated, or otherwise psychologically vulnerable were more likely to be on the losing end
of a successful police interrogation.... [T]he point [is] simply that we do
(and should) find it unseemly for government officials systematically to
seek out and take advantage of the psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen. Whether or not one considers such tactics necessary for effective
law enforcement, they convey a feeling of manipulation and exploitation
of the weak by the powerful that many would tolerate with at best considerable reluctance. 64

Similarly, Professor Greenawalt has maintained that tactics that
"make rational, responsible choice more difficult," such as playing on
a suspect's weaknesses or deceiving the suspect about crucial facts (for
example, whether a confederate has confessed), do not accord with
"autonomy and dignity."65
62. White, supra note 17, at 593. Professor Dix has argued "that a person confessing [should
be] afforded the same opportunities as a person pleading guilty who has not previously con·
fessed." Dix, supra note 26, at 330.
63. Cf In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
constitutionally required). The standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt increases the
number of mistaken verdicts in the interest of protecting the innocent. C. McCORMICK, McCOR·
MICK ON EVIDENCE 962 (3d ed. 1984).
64. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 871-72 (1981) (footnote
omitted).
65. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 40-41; see also Schrock, Welsh & Collins, supra note 17, at
42 n.174; White, supra note 17, at 627-28.
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Of course, as discussed above, if such manipulation is morally offensive, police interrogation should be abolished, for few suspects will
confess unless rational, responsible choice is made more difficult. This
is the point of the authors' book. As Professor Schulhofer observed in
the above quotation, however, such a practical concern does not seem
to address the moral issue. The more powerful response is that society's morality does not dictate such conclusions. Confessions law .will
begin to make sense only when we have the courage to rebut such
moral claims without hedge or apology. In the context of police interrogation, it simply is not morally offensive to "take advantage of the
psychological vulnerabilities of a citizen." 66
Debate about morality often is unsatisfactory. Professor Dix, for
example, has stated that the issue of police interrogation tactics "is not
. . . susceptible to logical debate or empirical inquiry and thus is a
matter that must be resolved according to an intuitive definition of
human dignity. " 67 This relativistic approach, however, concedes too
much to those who find the tactics of successful interrogation immoral. If the Constitution or morality condemned manipulation and
deception, the legal system would have to prohibit altogether practices
such as wiretapping and the use of informants. These practices do not
give the suspect a rational choice between silence and self-damaging
admissions, nor do they ensure that his admissions will be made "with
as complete an understanding of his tactical position as possible." 68
From a comparative standpoint, these practices do not seem more respectful of "autonomy and dignity" than the ordinary tactics of police
interrogation. In Hoffa v. United States, 69 for example, the informant, Partin, certainly manipulated and exploited Jimmy Hoffa as much
as custodial interrogation would have done; 70 indeed, direct rather
than surreptitious interrogation at least would have alerted Hoffa to
the risk of trickery and deceit. Of course, the police often employ
wiretapping and informants before they take the suspect into custody,
but the fact of custody does not seem relevant to the moral question of
inappropriate exploitation.
It may be countered at this point that the analogy to wiretapping
and the use of informants begs the question, for these practices also
may be morally offensive. 71 Such a claim, however, is counterintui66. Schulhofer, supra note 64, at 872. The authors weaken their case by arguing that both
"fair" and "unfair" practices are acceptable in police interrogation. P. xvii. The better argument
is that the authors' suggested tactics are not unfair in this context.
67. Dix, supra note 26, at 336.
68. Id. at 330-31.
69. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
70. See 385 U.S. at 294-300 {detailing how Partin deceived and manipulated Hoffa).
71. Cf Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1982, at 40, 41-42
(suggesting that police deception in the investigatory stages may breed a willingness to commit
perjury).
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tive, and it does not comport with society's morality as reflected in its
law. While limits exist, such as in the law of entrapment, 72 trickery
and deception as weapons in the arsenal of law enforcement have a
long history of approval. Indeed, even outside of law enforcement,
lying and deception always have been difficult issues that still lack categorical answers. 73 While commentators such as Schulhofer may be
in the vanguard of a new morality, they clearly are not in step with
either the past or present thinking of our society. Moreover, it must be
remembered that the moral issue in the law of confessions arises in a
constitutional context. The argument for imposing through constitutional dictate a minority morality, rooted neither in history nor tradition, is not apparent.
In considering the moral issue, it also is appropriate to recall that
while the police often use informants to develop probable cause, custodial interrogation typically occurs after a lawful arrest supported by
probable cause. "The subjects of such interrogation, therefore, cannot
be presumed innocent in a literal sense but instead must be viewed as
persons justifiably subject to certain state restraints and inconveniences that otherwise would not be acceptable." 74 In the authors'
words, many situations exist in which the "public welfare requires relinquishment of some personal comfort or even a sacrifice of a measure
of protection from governmental intrusion" (p. 91). I have made the
same point previously in another context:
Legal scholars have constructed various "models" to describe the
criminal justice system. These models, often couched in loaded terms,
include the due process model, the crime control model, and even the
family model. . . . In thinking about the criminal justice system, we need
a renewed commitment to the common law view that the individual cannot live in isolation, oblivious to the community's needs. One who
shares the benefits of community living may legitimately be expected to
make reasonable sacrifices on behalf of the community's efforts to solve
and control crime.75

This may seem excessively utilitarian, but assessment of the community's interests must inform to some extent moral evaluations of governmental conduct.
None of this is to deny that constitutional and moral limits exist on
what an interrogator may do to outwit a suspect. As previously discussed, deception is not acceptable when it is likely to induce a false
72. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (taking a narrow view of the entrap·
ment defense).
73. For recent attempts to treat the subject, sees. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978); C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 54-78 (1978).
74. Grano, supra note 33, at 902 (footnote omitted).
75. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 497 (1984); cf Caplan, supra note 23, at 1454 (questioning how human
dignity is advanced when a suspect maintains silence in the face of justifiable accusation).
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confession (p. 216). Likewise, it would not be acceptable for an interrogator to induce a confession by making a false promise of leniency76
or by posing as a jail chaplain or defense lawyer (pp. 216-17). That
some trickery and deception are morally acceptable does not mean
that "some extreme version of the battle model" 77 governs the investigatory process. Whether viewed in terms of what shocks the conscience, as the authors state it (p. 216), or in terms of moral principles
"rooted ... in history or in widely shared contemporary morality," as
I once stated it,78 some interrogation tactics exceed the bounds of
moral tolerance. The line between the acceptable and the unacceptable sometimes may be difficult to draw, but this should not count as a
reason for throwing the baby out with the bath.
The moral argument against successful interrogation tactics sometimes is varied to express a concern about equality among suspects.
Professor Greenawalt, for example, has complained that tactics such
as deception "work unevenly by undermining the inexperienced and
ignorant [while] having little effect on the hardened criminal."79 This
argument does not have merit. The inexperienced and ignorant suffer
disadvantages at every turn: they are more apt to leave clues at the
crime scene, less likely to take precautions against wiretapping and
informants, and more likely to be caught in deception by skillful crossexamination at trial. In any event, the ability of the sophisticated
criminal to escape conviction and punishment hardly counts as a legitimate argument for providing others similar means of escape. In Professor Robinson's words, "[t]here seems to be no justifiable end in
equal acquittal of the guilty." 80 It should follow that the moral acceptability of police tactics does not depend upon an equal distribution
of success.
Concededly, the argument for equality among defendants has more
force if the concern is unequal distribution of legal rights. If, for example, all defendants have a right to counsel during police interrogation, exercise of the right should not depend upon preexisting
knowledge, which only the rich or sophisticated may have. The pur76. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (due process violated by failure to keep
promise that induced guilty plea).
77. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 41.
78. Grano, supra note 33, at 918-19.
79. Greenawalt, supra note 26, at 41 (footnote omitted).
80. Robinson, Massiah, Escobedo, and Rationales for the Exclusion of Co11fessio11s, 56 J.
CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 412, 421 (1965) (footnote omitted); see also Caplan,
supra note 23, at 1456-58; Grano, supra note 33, at 914-15; Inbau, Over-Reaction-The Mischief
a/Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 797, 808-09 (1982); Letter from Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to Judge David Bazelon (June 24, 1965), reprinted in
Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind?-the Bazelo11-Katze11bach Letters 011
Poverty, Equality and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY. L.J. 461, 490-94 (1966)
(questioning why the gangster should be the model and all others raised, in the name of equality,
to the same level of success in suppressing evidence).
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pose of the analysis to this point, however, has been to determine what
legal rights a suspect should have. Escobedo premised a right to counsel on reasons that this essay has attempted to show lack merit. If
Escobedo 's reasoning is found wanting, its right to counsel is left without justification. Thus, the equality argument is needed to support the
right to counsel. To attempt now to premise the equality argument on
a preexisting right to counsel is to engage in circular reasoning.
All else having failed, the temptation will arise to insist that the
Constitution itself is the justification for the right to counsel. This, of
course, is a makeweight argument. If the Constitution spoke in unmistakable terms, the Court in Escobedo would not have been compelled to offer reasons for applying the right to counsel to the police
station. While the sixth amendment guarantees the assistance of counsel in "all criminal prosecutions," 81 the applicability of this right to
the investigatory stages of the criminal process is not self-evident from
the text. This is why the emphasis on underlying theoretical justification is necessary. 82
No more than its textual language, the sixth amendmenfs history
does not support its extension to protect a suspect from the investigatory process. The right to counsel evolved on the battleground of the
criminal trial; it sprang from complaints that a defendant without
counsel's assistance could not adequately defend himself in court
against legal charges. 83 The use of counsel to shield the defendant
from detection is fundamentally different, and is not supported by the
history of the right to counsel. 84 As I have shown in another article,
precedent also did not support the Court's extension of the right to
counsel to shield a suspect from the discovery of incriminating evidence. 85 The only remaining justification for so extending the right to
counsel is policy. I have attempted to demonstrate in this essay, however, that we do not have good reasons for injecting counsel as an
obstacle to successful police interrogation. To the contrary, as the authors maintain, we have sound reasons for permitting the police,
within limits, to employ interrogation tactics designed to outwit the
81. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82. Cf. Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1298-99 (1983) (making
a similar argument with regard to the first amendment).
83. See Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN. L.
REV. 1175, 1190-92 (1970).
84. See Grano, supra note 33, at 943. I previously have defended application of sixth amendment rights to investigatory procedures once adversary, judicial proceedings have commenced.
See id. at 942-44; Grano, supra note 19, at 18-31. This is the Court's current view. See note 19
supra. I now have doubts whether the sixth amendment's "shield" function is appropriate at any
stage of the process.
85. See Grano, supra note 19, at 19 n.117. The Constitution still does not provide a right to
counsel during questioning by an investigative grand jury. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976).
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suspect. 86
B.

The Argument for Permitting Some Pressure To Confess

The above discussion, though adequate in terms of Escobedo 's reasoning, has not taken account of the fifth amendment concerns that
informed Miranda. Even if we lack good reasons for assisting the suspect to make informed, intelligent decisions, limitations on police interrogation may be defended as necessary to protect the suspect's right
not to be compelled to become a witness against himself. Similarly,
even if Escobedo 's reasoning does not support a right to counsel, such
a right, as Miranda concluded, may be defensible in the interest of
protecting fifth amendment rights. My purpose now is to show that
Miranda's premises are equally as unsound as Escobedo's.
The first step to sound analysis is to recognize that, despite the
frequent incantation of the phrase, no "privilege against self-incrimination" exists in our law. Because the fifth amendment protects only
testimonial or communicative evidence, the state may compel a person
to produce self-incriminating physical evidence. 87 More fundamentally for present purposes, the fifth amendment protects not against
self-incrimination but against the state compelling a person to be a witness against himself. 88 Absent compulsion, a self-incriminating admission is not presumptively suspicious. "Indeed, far from being
prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if
not coerced, are inherently desirable." 89 Finally, unlike true privileges that protect the privacy of communications, the fifth amendment
"privilege" is not concerned at all with securing a zone of privacy for
the individual, for with a grant of immunity, the state can compel the
individual to tell all regardless of how embarrassing disclosure may
be.9o
Because confessions are testimonial evidence intended for use in
the criminal trial, the fifth amendment issue turns on the concept of
compulsion. What does it mean to compel a person to be a witness
86. In one of their most colorful examples, the authors describe how an interrogator called
his secretary into the interrogation room where one suspect was being questioned, leaving a cosuspect alone in the waiting room. Thereafter, the secretary returned to the waiting room and
began typing, ostensibly from the note pad she had taken into the interrogation room. She even
paused to ask the co-suspect how the suspect in the interrogation room spelled his name. When
the interrogator subsequently called the co-suspect in for interrogation, he had little trouble obtaining the confession. Why we would want to protect guilty suspects from such brilliant trickery escapes me.
87. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 265-67 (1967) (handwriting sample); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (blood sample); see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 396-401 (1976) (subpoena for documents).
88. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470-77 (1976) (search for incriminating documents); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
89. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977).
90. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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against himself? Historically, compulsion was nothing more than the
requirement, under penalty of law, that the individual respond to
questions under oath. 91 This requirement subjected the individual to
"the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt." 92 Such
legal compulsion, with its concomitant trilemma, is not present in the
stationhouse, and powerful arguments have been made, though they
lately have been ignored, that the fifth amendment simply has nothing
to do with the issue of police interrogation. 93 Semantically, of course,
it is virtually impossible for the Supreme Court to reverse its position
on this. One can imagine the reaction were the Court to rule that the
Constitution no longer prohibits the police from compelling a custodial suspect to incriminate himself. Realistically, therefore, we are left
with the task of defining compulsion in the context of police
interrogation.
Mere questioning by itself is not equivalent to compulsion. Thus, a
grand jury may question even a target of its investigation, and the target must invoke the right not to answer incriminating questions.94
Similarly, although the police have no authority to insist on answers
outside the custodial context, 95 a person subject to noncustodial questioning must assert the right not to answer. Absent a claim that the
interrogator has a right to an answer, to question is not to compel.
Because compulsion in the context of police interrogation refers
neither to legal compulsion nor to the mere fact of questioning, it can
be understood only as a synonym for coercion. That is, the fifth
amendment in this context protects a person from being coerced to
become a witness against himself. This, of course, is precisely what
the due process voluntariness cases protected against. Professor
Kamisar may rail against those who view the fifth amendment in the
police station as "little, if anything, more than the 'voluntary' test
masquerading under a different label," 96 but it cannot be anything
more. While the meaning of coercion may differ for due process and
91. Grano, supra note 33, at 926-28 & n.347; see also Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 36-37
(but finding this an unpersuasive reason for not applying the fifth amendment to the police
station).
92. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 476 (1976) (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront
Commn., 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
93. See, e.g., 3 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OP EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW§ 823 at 250 n.5 (3d ed. 1940);seealso id. at§§ 817-20, 823
(Chadbourn rev. 1970); 8 id. §§ 2250, 2266 (McNaughton rev. 1961). But see Y. KAMISAR,
supra note 13, at 36-37 (fifth amendment's "tangled and obscure history" permits, although it
does not dictate, its application to the police station).
94. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976).
95. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341
(1976).
96. Y. KAMISAR, supra note 13, at 67.
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fifth amendment purposes, both doctrines necessarily address the same
evil.
The difficulty lies in determining when permissible pressure shades
into coercion or "compulsion." Professor Kamisar lias attempted to
provide an answer:
It has been said that "there are a thousand forms of compulsion" and
that "our police show great ingenuity in the variety employed." But "a
confession obtained by compulsion must be excluded whatever may have
been the character of the compulsion." If the police conduct is designed
and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a tug on" a suspect
to incriminate himself ... then that conduct is "compulsion" as Miranda
defines the self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intensifies the
tolerable level of stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by unadulterated arrest and detention to the impermissible level of "compulsion." 97

A confession must be excluded "whatever may have been the character of the compulsion"? A tactic imposes "compulsion" even if it
merely exerts "a tug" on the suspect? If Professor Kamisar is correct,
everything the authors recommend in their book is "compulsion."
But is Kamisar correct? Does even he really believe these claims?
Professor Kamisar acknowledges that "[d]istinguishing degrees ...
is inherent in the process of defining 'compel.' " 98 While acknowledging that all police questioning, whether custodial or not, generates
some pressure, he candidly concedes that the fifth amendment does
not protect against all pressure. 99 Indeed, Professor Kamisar has
stated forthrightly that "[z]ero-value pressure conditions" are impossible to attain. 100 If the definition of "compel" is a matter of degree, 101
some justification is needed for defining the word in the way Miranda
did and Kamisar would. Recognizing that the fifth amendment does
not prohibit the pressure generated by the officer's badge in the noncustodial context, we need to ask why it should prohibit the inherent
pressure of custodial questioning or even the pressures generated by
the authors' tactics. Stated differently, only a policy analysis can provide the appropriate definition of compulsion.
An expansive view of "compulsion" cannot be premised on a dis97. Id. at 160 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original).
98. Id. at 42 n.2.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 155 n.20.
10 I. Of course, the definition of "compel" must be a matter of degree. Kamisar is right that
zero-value pressure simply is impossible. On the other hand, no matter how great the pressure,
an undrugged, conscious person always can choose to endure. Thus, unless the issue is seen as
one of degree, either all statements are coerced or none are. From a legal perspective, neither
alternative is satisfactory. Words like "compel,'' "coerce," and "voluntary," therefore, must
draw their meaning from policy considerations, and their meaning accordingly should vary in
different legal contexts. Grano, supra note 33, at 862-63, 880-86. Try as we may, we cannot
escape Justice Harlan's insight that the question must be "how much pressure on the suspect [is]
permissible." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 507, 515 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also note 36 supra and
accompanying text.
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like of self-incriminating statements. As discussed in the last section
of this essay, our morality approves interrogation tactics, including
trickery and deception, intended to convince a suspect to confess.
Moreover, as noted above, the fifth amendment does not provide protection against self-incrimination as such. 102 If we prefer that suspects tell the truth - if, that is, we prefer the police to succeed with
interrogation - we should not define compulsion so as to eliminate all
"tugs" on the suspect to confess. The Supreme Court itself has recognized that the fifth amendment does not require such protection:
The Constitution does not prohibit every element which influences a
criminal suspect to make incriminating admissions. Of course, for many
witnesses the grand jury room engenders an atmosphere conducive to
truthtelling, for it is likely that upon being brought before such a body of
neighbors and fellow citizens, and having been placed under a solemn
oath to tell the truth, many witnesses will feel obliged to do just that.
But it does not offend the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment if in that
setting a witness is more likely to tell the truth than in less solemn surroundings. The constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not be
compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. 103

The policies underlying the fifth amendment do not suggest that
we should protect the defendant from either the inherent pressures of
custodial interrogation or the authors' anxiety-inducing tactics. The
protection embodied in the fifth amendment arose in the midst of
stormy political controversies concerning the English church courts
and the Star Chamber. 104 We cannot be sure whether this protection
developed as a tactical weapon against these institutions or whether it
had its own independent justifications. The justifications we typically
see today are largely after-the-event formulations. 105 For this reason,
they deserve especially careful scrutiny.
In Miranda, the Court stated that the "one overriding thought"
underlying the fifth amendment "is the respect a government ... must
accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens." 106 As discussed in
the previous section of this essay, however, our morality does not consider the tactics of successful interrogation an affront to human dignity. Miranda also indicated that the fifth amendment seeks to
maintain a "fair state-individual balance" and to require the government "to shoulder the entire load." 107 The concept of fairness, how102. See notes 88-89 supra and accompanying text.
103. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187-88 (1977) (citations omitted, emphasis
in original).
104. See L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1968).
105. For an exhaustive review of possible underlying policies, see McNaughton, The Privilege

Against Self-Incrimination: Its Constitutional Affectation, Raison d'Etre and Miscel/aneous Implications, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 223 (C. Sowle ed. 1962).
106. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
107. 384 U.S. at 460 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE (McNaughton rev.), supra note 93, at 317).
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ever, like the concept of dignity, requires analysis. The previous
section argued that our morality does not consider it "unfair" for the
state to succeed in obtaining a confession or a conviction. Likewise,
only a sporting theory of justice could favor equality between the suspect and the state for its own sake. 108 It also is fiction to say that our
legal system requires the government to shoulder the entire load. .We
require the defendant to stand in lineups for identification, to provide
fingerprints, blood, and handwriting samples, to submit to psychiatric
examinations, to provide pretrial discovery of certain defenses and witnesses, and sometimes even to respond to subpoenas for documents. 109
We also permit grand juries to subpoena targets of their investigations.110 Of coursek one may attempt to distinguish these practices
from police interrogation. The point remains, however, that in defining the concept of compulsion, the old saw that the government must
bear the entire load does not provide assistance, for it simply is not
true.
Miranda also drew support from the aphorism that ours is an accusatorial system of justice. 111 This, however, is no more true than the
proposition that the government must bear the entire load. Indeed, if
our system did not have both accusatorial and inquisitorial attributes,
the investigative grand jury and the other procedures mentioned in the
previous paragraph would not"be possible. Because we in fact have a
mixed system of justice, 112 the question cannot be whether police interrogation is inquisitorial, which it is, but whether we have reasons
for distinguishing this inquisitorial institution from the others we permit in our system.
Professor Kamisar's protests notwithstanding, good reasons do not
exist for defining fifth amendment compulsion any differently than due
process coercion. As a policy word, the concept of compulsion necessarily must reflect society's desire, on the one hand, for successful police interrogation and society's revulsion, on the other hand, of certain
offensive police methods. 113 Only such a balancing can define the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See notes 58-63 supra and accompanying text.
See Grano, supra note 33, at 934 (reviewing cases).
United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181 (1977).

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
See Goldstein, Reflections on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal
Procedure, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1009 (1974). The error of regarding our system as "accusatorial"
and not "inquisitorial" is not harmless. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1148 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (building on premise that ours is an accusatorial system).
113. See generally Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (drawing on the due process confession
cases to define the concept of voluntary consent). In its recent Miranda cases, the Court has
recognized these competing concerns. See Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1144 (1986). The
Court has never recognized, however, that these concerns cannot properly be balanced as long as
Miranda remains viable.
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point at which the pressure to confess becomes "undue." 114 To ignore
this reality is to overlook, as even Professor Kamisar has conceded, 115
that distinguishing degrees is inherent in the process of defining the
concept of compulsion.
This approach to fifth amendment compulsion actually comports
with both pre-Miranda and post-Miranda precedent. When the Court
in the nineteenth century first suggested in a federal case that the fifth
amendment had some bearing on police interrogation, it expressed the
applicable test in terms of a voluntariness standard, and it declined to
hold that either custody or questioning automatically invalidated a
confession. 116 Similarly, a fifth amendment voluntariness test controlled questioning of the defendant at the preliminary examination, a
practice that persisted in this country until the middle of the nineteenth century. 117 When the Court first applied the fifth amendment
to the states, it observed that the due process voluntariness doctrine in
state confession cases reflected fifth amendment requirements. 118
Outside the custodial context, where the fifth amendment but not Miranda applies, the admissibility of confessions is governed by a voluntariness test. 119 Moreover, while Miranda's prophylactic rule does
not prevent the use for impeachment purposes of a statement obtained
in violation of Miranda, an "involuntary" statement cannot be used
for any purpose. 120 In short, as the Court reiterated only recently,
outside the trial context the fifth amendment has imposed only a voluntariness requirement: "The constitutional guarantee is only that the
witness be not compelled to give self-incriminating testimony. The test
is whether, considering the totality of circumstances, the free will of
the witness was overbome." 121
The remaining question is whether the suspect's "right of silence"
dictates greater protection than a voluntariness approach affords. If,
as I have suggested, the first step to sound analysis is to recognize that
no "privilege against self-incrimination" exists, the second step is to
recognize, again despite the frequent incantations of the phrase, that
there is no right of silence. The fifth amendment right is a right not to
be compelled to become a witness against oneself. The right of silence
114. See note 36 supra and accompanying text; see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1468-76.
115. See note 101 supra and accompanying text.
116. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542, 558, 562 (1897).
117. Powers v. United States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S.
613, 623 (1896). The practice of questioning the accused at the examination ended in the middle
of the nineteenth century. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIFrH AMENDMENT? 16
(1959).
118. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6-8 (1964).
119. E.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347-48 (1976).
120. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
121. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) (emphasis in original).
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exists only in the limited sense that the state cannot compel a person
to answer.
This is not just a semantic quibble. If a right of silence as such
existed, we could not justify protecting that right only for those in
custody, for the fifth amendment applies to the noncustodial as well as
the custodial suspect. Similarly, the concept of waiver would have to
apply whenever the police engage in questioning, for any response to
interrogaton would be a relinquishment of the "right of silence."
Thus, if we truly recognized a right of silence, Miranda's limitation of
its warning and waiver requirements to custodial interrogation could
not be defended. Of course, Miranda imposed its requirements to
combat the inherent compulsion of custodial interrogation, but this is
precisely the point; Miranda's concern, despite its loose language, was
compulsion, not a right of silence as such. If the fifth amendment
guaranteed a right of silence, even wiretapping and the use of informants could raise troubling issues. Certainly the use of a suspect's
silence as evidence would not be impermissible only when the police
provided antecedent Miranda warnings. 122
In summary, then, we have no reason to read the fifth amendment
as prohibiting police interrogation, as protecting against the inherent
pressure of custodial interrogation, or as prohibiting the tactics the
authors suggest to increase the suspect's anxiety in the police station.
The authors' tactics are inconsistent with Miranda's premises, but it is
those premises, not their tactics, that lack persuasive justification.
IV.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted to show in this essay that the authors' suggested
tactics for successful police interrogation are inconsistent with the two
strands of thought that have influenced modern confessions law. I
also have attempted to demonstrate that both of these strands of
thought are unsound. Nothing in our Constitution or our morality
precludes the police, within limits, from trying to outsmart the suspect
and to increase the pressure on him to tell the truth. Indeed, our morality actually approves such interrogation efforts.
The Supreme Court has applied the right to counsel to police interrogation both to help the suspect make informed, intelligent decisions
and to protect him from interrogation's inherent pressures. I have
tried to show in this essay that neither justification is persuasive and
that both run counter to the appropriate functions and goals of police
interrogation. Of course, with unexacting waiver requirements, the
authors' program for professional interrogation can coexist with a
right of counsel, but only intellectual dishonesty can make such coexistence theoretically compatible. If my arguments against the prem122. See Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986).
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ises of Escobedo and Miranda are persuasive, counsel should be
barred, for all defendants, from the interrogation room.
The law openly should permit, as the authors desire, a reasonable
period of custodial interrogation once a suspect has been arrested on
probable cause. 123 While the police should not be permitted to assert
that the suspect must answer their questions, they should have leeway
to attempt to convince him to tell the truth. The law should preclude
tactics that are likely to induce a false confession, and it likewise
should preclude tactics that offend well-established moral principles.
In short, whether under due process or the fifth amendment, some
form of voluntariness test should control.1 24
If we really believed in the philosophy that underlies cases like Escobedo and Miranda, we would have to regard Criminal Interrogation
and Confessions as a blueprint for police illegality. It is no such thing.
The book is a manual for successful interrogation that a free, civilized,
and just society can and should endorse without apology. We are indebted to the authors for helping to demonstrate how misguided our
recent direction has been.
123. Cf Proposed Mich. Ct. R. 6.104(A): "An arrested person must be taken without unnecessary delay before a judicial officer for arraignment in accordance with the provisions of this
rule. A delay is not "unnecessary" solely because the police interrogated the accused before
bringing him to court." 422A Mich. 10 (1985). [The author of this review is reporter of the
committee that submitted Proposed Rules of Criminal Procedure to the Michigan Supreme
Court. The Court has published the proposed rules for public comment.].
124. I previously have recommended that the Court revert to a modified voluntariness test.
Grano, supra note 33; see also Caplan, supra note 23, at 1467-76 (arguing that Miranda should be
overruled).

